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JURISDICTION AND CASE HISTORY 
Appeal is taken from an order, dated March 10, 1989, by the 
Honorable Timothy R. Hanson of the Third Judicial District Court, 
dismissing Appellants1 (hereafter "City") Amended Complaint tor 
declaratory relief in this consolidated action. Notice of appeal 
was filed with the District Court Clerk on April 3, 1989. Utah 
Code Section 78-2-2(j) confers on this Court jurisdiction over the 
appeal. 
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
The issue presented on appeal is whether the District Court 
erred in ruling, as a matter of law and without factual inquiry 
that: 
1. UTAH CODE ANN. Section 73-9-30, provides the only means 
for withdrawal from the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District 
(herein "District"). 
2. The non-elected board of directors of the District may 
constitutionally tax properties in Sandy City. 
3. Rudimentary constructive notice of the District's 
proposed 1989 bonding was adequate to meet statutory and due 
process standards. 
4. The District Court lacks authority to approve forms and 
procedures by which issues relating to the District can be 
presented to the public for consideration. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Sandy City and Its Community Objectives 
1. Sandy City is a municipal corporation createa oy puouc 
1 
election to offer a full range of urban governmental services to 
its residents and surrounding areas undergoing development. These 
services are essential for sound urban development and for the 
protection of public health, safety and welfare in residential, 
commercial ard industrial areas, and in areas undergoing 
development,1 
2. Sandy's population has increased at a startling rate 
(approximately 700% between 1970 and 1980) and continues to grow.2 
The City's growth results both from internal development and from 
extension of City boundaries into urbanized unincorporated areas. 
A critical objective of the City is to promote ordered growth 
pursuant to a master plan and to permit annexation of surrounding 
urbanized territory, in a manner which promotes rational 
boundaries.3 
3. The City is governed by locally elected officials. 
These representatives have statutory powers delegated under express 
constitutional authority.4 They also have broad "inherent" 
authority to provide the services critical to the public and state 
economic development.5 
1




 S-245; See also, UTAH CODE ANN. 10-2-401(5), 10-9-3, 10-9-
20, and 10-9-21. 
Discussed in Point III, hereafter. 
5
 State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116, 1118-26 (Utah 1980), 
restricting Dillon's Rule requiring strict construction of 
municipal powers. 
2 
4. Powers are broadly granted to elected city officials in 
order that they may effectively perform their public functions. 
However, City leaders are under close public scrutiny. They must 
carefully balance many competing needs in order that the public can 
control, through them, the policies that uniquely affect them. In 
Sandy, such needs include health protection, public safety, 
transportation, and education.6 
5. Perhaps the most critical of all City services is 
providing domestic water. The City has prudently accumulated 
precious mountain water for its residents, including much of the 
flow of Little Cottonwood Canyon. Among the major objectives of 
the City is to supply this water to its citizens at reasonable 
rates.7 This objective is part of a larger community goal of 
achieving eventual water self-sufficiency, under an efficient 
interlocal coordination plan.8 
6. The City does not have its own water treatment 
facilities. Until recently, the only means to treat and transport 
City water was from the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy 
District. The District has been charging the City high prices for 
its water treatment, which costs must be passed on to City 
residents.9 City officials have had no choice — they must pay the 
S-244. This balancing role is described in Loveland v. 
Orem City, 746 P.2d 763, 773 (Ut Sup Ct 1987). 
7
 S-245 and S-262 
8
 S-245, -277, -292. 
9
 S-275 and -279. 
3 
Districts price or let the water run to waste. 
7. The Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City has 
a treatment plant at the mouth of Little Cottonwood Canyon. The 
plant is ideally situated to treat the City's Canyon water. Metro 
also has surplus water available to provide a firm source of water 
sufficient to assure water independence to the Sandy Community. 
8. In 1987, the City asked the Metropolitan District to 
consider enlarging its plant to treat the City's water. The City's 
objective then was only to acquire a treatment source for its 
canyon water rights at a fair price.11 
9. From discussions between the City and Metro, a Water 
Study and Plan emerged which called for the City to be annexed into 
Metro as a full member. Such membership would provide the long 
term water and treatment the City needed to meet its community 
goals.12 
10. The plan also called for the City to withdraw from the 
Conservancy District in order free up District resources and to 
avoid double-taxation of City residents. The plan assessed long 
term water supply security, future rates, institutional and 
engineering requirements, and other impacts.13 
11. The plan shows a substantial savings for City residents 
10
 S - 2 9 2 . 
11
 S-275 t o - 2 7 6 . 
12
 I d . 
13
 S-274 t o - 2 7 6 . 
4 
from annexation to Metropolitan. For instance, water treatment 
costs in Metropolitan about half the Conservancy rate.14 There are 
also important benefits to each of the entities.15 Under the plan, 
the City will pay its share of outstanding bonded indebtedness and 
continue to nonor a water purchase contract important to 
Conservancy. The City will also protect Conservancy's tax revenues 
by phasing withdrawals so as to roughly equal the expected rise in 
tax base in the balance of Conservancy's service area. 
12. The Conservancy District refused accept the plan or to 
otherwise approve the City's withdrawal from the District. The 
District claimed that it had no authority to approve land 
withdrawals, although it had recently approved withdrawals in 1979 
and 1987. 
13. The District's apparent intention is to retain the 
City's tax base even though the City would be no longer deriving 
services from the District. Such taxes will then subsidize water 
rates in other areas of the District. The District's refusal may 
also be explained by the nature of its organization, as described 
below. 
The Water Conservancy District and the Adverse Impact of its 
Policies on Sandy Residents. 
14. The Conservancy District was created by the judiciary 
,H






in 1951, pursuant to a landowner petition. The boundaries of Sandy 
City were included in the District. Although signatures of not 
fewer than 5% of landowners are required to include the City,17 
Sandy landowners were apparently not among those petitioning. 
15. No election was required to establish the District and 
district directors are not elected.19 Nevertheless, the District 
possesses broad governmental powers, levying ad valorem taxes20 and 
using eminent domain.21 The City is prohibited from requiring a 
franchise for Conservancy's use of City streets, as required for 
other utilities,22 and Conservancy can prohibit other political 
entities from delivering water within the City.23 
16. District decision-making tends to be dictated at a staff 
level.24 District staff restricts important budget information 
from the Board and resists financial accountability.25 Further, 
there is "only nominal continued supervision of the District by the 
17
 UTAH CODE ANN. 73-9-4. 
18 • • • • 
Addresses of petitioners in the files of the district court 
are outside of Sandy boundaries. S-ll to -14. 
19
 UTAH CODE ANN. 73-9-7 and 73-9-9. 
20
 UTAH CODE ANN. 73-9-15. 
21
 UTAH CODE ANN. 73-9-13(5). 
22
 UTAH CODE ANN. 73-9-13.3. 
23





state through the governor's power to appoint directors." 
17. Public participation is discouraged by the Conservancy 
District. For instance, the District has invented a way to 
effectively give bondholders recourse to the District and its 
taxpayers without an election or meaningful public notice.27 
18. The Conservancy District's objectives are singular, 
narrow and commercial, and unconnected with the general 
• 28 
administration of municipal affairs. It does not balance the 
broad interests of the public. It decides what is in the best 
interest of the District, and instructs its directors that to 
consider the needs of the public would violate the directors' oaths 
of office and would be unethical.29 
19. District decisions tend to be insensitive to cost 
containment and productivity efficiencies. District construction 
of an elaborate new office complex30 is an example of spending 
excesses. As a result District tax rates are at the maximum level 
and water rates are unnecessarily high.31 
20. The District discourages intergovernmental cooperation, 
particularly as it provides retail water services in and around 
Robert W. Swensen, "A Primer of Utah Water Law: Part II," 
1985 Utah Law Review 1, 48. 
27
 Discussed in Point IV, hereafter. 
28
 UTAH CODE ANN. 73-9-1. 
29






cities. Such practice "primes" areas not yet ready for 
development, greatly complicating urban planning and increases 
service costs to citizens.32 
21. District operations interfere with a broad range of 
public and municipal objectives, including the ability to develop 
rational boundaries, to adhere to a master plan,33 and to make City 
water available to residents at reasonable rates. Also, District 
tax and rate increases divert public resources from competing needs 
of the community, such as public education, safety, and 
transportation.34 
The Metropolitan Water District and its Support for City 
Objectives. 
22. The Metropolitan Water District differs substantially 
from the Conservancy District. It was approved by the elected 
officials of Salt Lake City to supply water for municipal uses. 
An election was then held to ratify the Metro district. An 
election will also be held to consider annexation of Sandy City to 
the District. 
23. After Sandy joins Metro, it may withdraw, by election, 
at any time. Metro board members will be appointed by elected city 
officials, the District's boundaries will remain identical to city 





the cities according to their proportionate tax burdens. 
24. Metropolitan owns extensive water resources. It has 
offered a surplus of those waters to the City on a firm and 
uninterruptible basis. It has also offered to treat the Cityfs 
Little Cottonwood Water at rates far below those maintained by the 
Conservancy District.35 
Role of the Third District Court. 
25. The District Court has had legal, equitable and 
administrative responsibility relating to the Conservancy District 
since judicial organization of the Conservancy District in 1951. 
Annexations to and withdrawal from the District have been 
repeatedly brought to the District Court for approval. Actions 
approving these boundary changes are consolidated in this case.36 
26. The District Court approved withdrawals of property 
from Conservancy in 1979 and 1987, at Conservancy's request, ruling 
that it had power to permit withdrawal.37 The District Court 
suddenly and expressly repudiated these powers, again at 
Conservancy's request, in the Order dismissing Sandy's Complaint.38 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Early this century, it was hoped that special districts would 
be a great benefit to state development. There has been an 
T-74. 
S-71. 
S-43 to -48; S-49 to -57. 
R-123 to -128. 
9 
extensive growth in Utah special districts since that time. This 
growth has caused inefficiency and confusion in local government, 
particularly in Salt Lake County. Many districts now form an 
obstruction to representative government and orderly valley 
development. 
The setting of the appeal is in the shadowy world of special 
district governance. All issues pose a common question: is there 
a means of relief from economic domination by one of the most 
entrenched of these shadow governments — the Salt Lake County 
Water Conservancy District? 
State statute expressly provides an escape from an oppressive 
water district — by permitting voters to withdraw from "any water 
district" by election. If City voters can withdraw from the Salt 
Lake County Water Conservancy District, paying their fair share of 
District indebtedness, the District's stranglehold over City water 
resources will be broken. 
The City seeks review of a lower court ruling that the 
Conservancy District is not subject to this statute. Under the 
court's decision, Sandy voters must remain forever in the District 
— or until such time as the District determines it is in its own 
best interests to let them go. 
If this ruling is upheld, and Sandy residents must remain tax 
hostages to this district, each of the City's remaining issues 
raised in this appeal are accentuated, namely: 
1. May the non-elected board of directors of the District 
constitutionally tax City residents, especially when those 
10 
residents no longer derive water services of any kind from the 
District? 
2. May the District bond without effective notice to the 
public and, through their bond agreements, obligate tax revenues 
to the maximum without a hearing or election? 
3. Does the Court have authority to approve some means by 
which issues relating to the District can be actually considered 
by the public? 
Each of these issues is of first impression and involves 
questions of fact, law, and public policy. The trial court refused 
to consider evidence introduced on any issue. Its decision is 
therefore granted no deference on appeal. On the contrary, 
dismissal can only be appropriate where it appears "to a certainty" 
that the City would not be entitled to relief under any state of 
facts which could be provided in support of its claims.39 No such 
certainty exists and the trial court's dismissal should, therefore, 
be reversed. 
POINT I 
MISPERCEPTION OF THIS ACTION BY THE TRIAL COURT REQUIRES 
CLARIFICATION BOTH FROM AN HISTORIC AND A PUBLIC POLICY 
PERSPECTIVE 
A. THE LOWER COURT'S DISMISSAL WAS BASED UPON A SUPERFICIAL AND 
ERRONEOUS GOVERNANCE MODEL. 
The trial court viewed this action in absolute terms. It 
construed the law as settled and rejected any fact which might 
Mountaineer v. Utah Power
 f P. 2d , 107 Utah Adv. Rep. 
71, 72, citing Freeaard v. First W. Nat'l Bank, 738 P.2d 614, 616 
(Utah 1987) . 
11 
suggest a constitutional question. It also nullified its own 
powers to avoid consideration of community frustrations with 
Conservancy District governance.40 
This approach implies acceptance of a simple governance model. 
The model casts districts as docile, static and alike, such that 
precedent supporting one type district, early this century, 
validates all other types, generations later. The model also 
ignores the cumulative impact of proliferating districts and 
assumes that evolving community interests play an insignificant 
role in constitutional governance. 
The trial court's model received some acceptance in simpler 
times. But this superficial approach is no longer valid in Utah. 
Districts differ greatly in their governance and impact on local 
communities. Some have positive profiles — some frustrate 
community governance. For this reason, constitutional issues 
impacting local communities require discrete factual inquiry and 
balancing of interest analysis. 
Just as service districts differ — all water districts are 
The district court's view of its own powers is remarkably 
elastic. The same powers which are construed broadly to uphold 
district recommendations, shrink to nullity when faced with 
community criticism of Conservancy District actions. See Point 
IV, hereafter. 
Some very early jurists saw all water districts as 
similar. People v. Letford, 79 P.2d 274, 281 (Colo. 1938); also 
Tyqeson v. Magna Water Co., 226 P.2d 127, 130 (Ut. 1950). 
42
 West Jordan v. State Retirement Board, 767 P.2d 530 (Utah 
Sup Ct. 1989), is illustrative of this more sophisticated 
approach. 
12 
not the same. Likewise, individual conservancy districts differ in 
their actual practices and their impact on local communities. 
Different constitutional conclusions follow from the actual 
practices of each district/3 Constitutional analysis of 
particular district practices best occursi in both an historic and 
public policy context. 
B. PATCHWORK DISTRICT GOVERNANCE IN UTAH, PARTICULARLY SALT LAKE 
VALLEY, PROVIDES THE FIRST IMPORTANT CONTEXT FOR THE CITY'S CLAIMS 
Utah statutes authorize at least 13 kinds of service 
districts. Some 8 of these districts deal with water. Statutes 
authorizing this array were not passed at one time. Rather, the 
were adopted in sporadic and piecemeal fashion, from 1913 to 1975, 
as the problem indicated by the type of district arose. The result 
is a patchwork structure in important statutory provisions. 
There are wide fluctuations in the methods of organizing a 
district and selecting its executive officers. Some districts are 
created by local elected officials to compliment a specific 
community objective. Others may be organized by a minority 
interest without meaningful notice to the public or their elected 
representatives. Similarly, the method of appointment of the 
governing body of a district differs widely. Local communities may 
This district-by-district analysis is discussed in Part 
III and dispels the allegation of Salt Lake and Grand County 
Conservancy Districts, that this action diminishes the validity 
of all districts. 
4
 Benson, "Special Districts and Deficient Local-Government 
in the Salt Lake Metropolitan Area," 7 Utah Law Review 2 09 
(1960). 
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or may not have selection input, depending on a particular statute. 
Many of these districts levy special assessments and general 
ad valorem property taxes, borrow funds, exercise eminent domain 
and unregulated monopoly authority. These broad fiscal powers 
exist "notwitnstanding the fact that the districts in most 
instances become autonomies not answerable to other units of 
government.I|45 
The proliferation of special purpose districts has created 
serious local governance problems in Utah. These districts 
exercise limited functions and operate apart from general units of 
local government such as cities and counties. The territorial 
jurisdiction of these governments often overlap, creating difficult 
problems particularly in metropolitan areas/6 
Salt Lake County poses the most serious problem. At least 
twelve full-function cities and towns exist in that county. Salt 
Lake County also engages in the delivery of municipal services. 
business. Nevertheless, at least nineteen special purpose 
districts have been organized to duplicate municipal functions and 
complicate the local government puzzle: 
The anomalous result is the existence of thirty-one units of 
local government attempting to meet the needs of an area whose 
topography is uniform and whose population is constantly 
becoming more evenly distributed as suburbanization makes its 
rapid advance.47 
45
 IdL, P. 210. 
46 
Swenson, supra., p. 38. 
47 
Benson, supra, p. 211. 
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The proliferation of overlapping service districts has serious 
effects in the Salt Lake Valley: 
Are there any logical bases for dividing into special 
districts governmental functions and responsibilities in a 
relatively compact area such as the Salt Lake Metropolitan 
Area, where nearly half of Utah's population is concentrated? 
A few examples from the report of the Local Government Survey 
Commission, which recently completed a factual study of local 
government structure in Utah, provide the obvious answer. 
Unnecessary expenses are incurred because special districts 
employ their own legal counsel, thereby duplicating functions 
of the city or county attorney's office. Expenses are further 
increased because there is no central purchasing authority, 
and, consequently, none of the economies of large-scale 
purchasing are realized. Duplicate purchases of equipment and 
the necessary maintenance facilities as well as duplication 
of personnel also increase costs. Taxpayers in some instances 
are subject simultaneously to as many as five local government 
authorities. In such confusion taxpayers sometimes do not 
even receive the specific service the district is supposed to 
provide. For example, in the suburban area southeast of Salt 
Lake City, taxpayers have to purchase water from ten private 
water companies, as well as from Salt Lake City, and at the 
same time are taxed by the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy 
District, from which they receive no water. The compilers of 
the report felt that the latter situation was "close to double 
taxation," and the inequality of the situation does seem 
obvious." [Emphasis Added] 
Inadequately supervised water districts are widely recognized 
as a major service delivery problem. The National Water Commission 
has outlined frequent water supply problems arising from water 
districts, as follows: 
/ Q 
Id., p. 212. "Double taxation" is particularly possible 
in the case of water conservancy districts which levy general 
property taxes as distinguished from special assessments. The 
Utah Supreme Court has adopted the widely held proposition that 
while benefits must be proportionate to special assessments in 
order to meet the requirements of due process, a provision for 
notice and a hearing to object to the organization of the 
district is all that due process requires when general ad valorem 
property taxes are to be levied. See, e.g., Lehi City v. 
Meiling, 87 Utah 237, 250, 48 P.2d 530, 536 (1935). 
15 
1. Inadequate or unnecessarily costly service because too 
many different water agencies are operating within the same 
metropolitan area, 
2. Poor integration of water supply, wastewater treatment 
and drainage services with each other and with planning for the use 
and occupancy of land. 
3. Insufficient attention to the nonutility aspects of 
providing metropolitan water services—including neglect of 
recreational, aesthetic, and environmental values.49 
Not all water districts are sources of this problem. As 
discussed earlier, the Metropolitan District was created by public 
election and serves as an aid to accomplishing community interests. 
However, the Salt Lake County Water Conservancy District has not 
performed such a helping role to the Sandy Community. On the 
contrary, it is cited as the principle problem areas in this "new 
dark continent of American politics."50 
C. STATE POLICY PROVIDES A SECOND CRITICAL CONTEXT FOR THIS 
ACTION 
There is a comprehensive constitutional plan under which urban 
service delivery is managed. Cities are empowered to provide the 
full range of urban services necessary for urban development. City 
officials are elected and closely scrutinized to insure that 
community interests are considered and balanced in a coordinated 
National Water Commission, Water Policies for the Future, 
442, 449 (1973), quoted in Trelease and Gould, Cases and 
Materials on Water Law, (4th Ed. 1986), pp. 534-535. 
See discussion in Benson, supra, p. 212-216. 
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manner. 
Limited function districts can play a role under our 
constitutional model, but they must remain under the control of 
the public and their local elected officials, insuring that 
community development is not factionalized and interests are fairly 
balanced. Article XIV, Section 8 of the Utah Constitution outlines 
this structure as follows: 
The Legislature by general law may authorize any county, city, 
or town to establish special districts within all or any part 
of the county, city, or town to be governed by the governing 
authority of the county, city, or town with power to provide 
water, sewerage, drainage, flood control, garbage, hospital, 
transportation, recreation, and fire protection services or 
any combination of these services and may authorize the 
county, city, or town: (1) to levy taxes upon the taxable 
property in only such districts for the purpose of acquiring, 
constructing, equipping, operating, and maintaining facilities 
required for any or all of these services, and (2) to issue 
bonds of these districts for the purpose of acquiring, 
constructing, and equipping any of these facilities without 
regard to the limitations of Sections 3 and 4 of this Article 
XIV but subject to such limitation on the aggregate amount of 
these bonds which may be outstanding at any one time as may 
be provided by law; but the authority to levy taxes upon the 
taxable property in these districts and to issue bonds of 
these districts payable from taxes levied on the taxable 
property in them shall be conditioned upon the assent of a 
majority of the gualified electors of the district voting in 
an election for this purpose to be held as provided by law. 
Any such district created by a county may contain all or part 
of any incorporated municipality or municipalities but only 
with the consent of the governing authorities thereof. Laws 
in effect at the time of the adoption of this section and 
districts established pursuant to these laws shall not be 
affected by the adoption of this section. [Emphasis added] 
Some service districts, such as Conservancy, have found a path 
around this constitutional model. Contrary to the consolidated and 
tightly-controlled plan, these districts handle each aspect of 
service delivery as a free-wheeling entity. Once created, they 
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take on a life-of-their-own, proliferating and overlapping; 
disconnected from and independent of public interest or control. 
Their relevance is not re-examined as their bureaucracies grow — 
an ever increasing hinderance to popular sovereignty. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT SANDY 
VOTERS CANNOT WITHDRAW FROM THE CONSERVANCY 
DISTRICT THROUGH PUBLIC ELECTION 
A. UTAH CODE ANN. 73-8-50 EXPRESSLY PERMITS WITHDRAWAL FROM WATER 
DISTRICTS BY ELECTION. THE DISTRICT COURT'S DISMISSAL ROBBED THIS 
STATUTE OF ITS PLAIN AND LITERAL MEANING 
The Metropolitan Water District is not one of the problem 
districts discussed above. It was established through election to 
service public needs and operates in close harmony with city 
objectives. This is one reason the City seeks to join it. 
Section 73-8-49(2) of the Metropolitan Water District Act 
permits a city to join a metropolitan water district by popular 
vote. Metropolitan has approved annexation of Sandy City, subject 
to the public election called for in this section. 
The section which immediately follows the annexation statute, 
permits a city to withdraw "from any water district" by the same 
election process as specified in Section 73-8-49. As Sandy joins 
the Metropolitan District, it also proposes to withdraw from the 
Conservancy District by the election process of this section. It 
states: 
Any municipality whose corporate area has become 
or is a part of any water district may withdraw therefrom 
in the following manner: 
The governing body of any such municipality may 
submit to the electors thereof at any general or special 
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election the proposition of withdrawing from any water 
district incorporated thereunder. Notice of such 
election shall be given in the manner provided in 
subsection 73-8-49(2). Such election shall be conducted 
and the returns thereof canvassed in the manner provided 
by law for the conduct of municipal elections in said 
city. In the event that the majority of the electors 
voting thereon vote in favor of such withdrawal, the 
result thereof shall be certified by the governing body 
of such municipality to the board of directors of the 
district. A certificate of the proceedings hereunder 
shall be made by the secretary of the district and filed 
with the lieutenant governor, and upon the filing of such 
certificate the area of the municipality so withdrawing 
shall be excluded from the said water district, and shall 
no longer be a part thereof; provided, however, that the 
property within the said municipality as it shall exist 
at the time of such exclusion shall continue taxable for 
the purpose of paying said bonded and other indebtedness 
outstanding or contracted for, at the time of such 
exclusion and until such bonded or other indebtedness 
shall have been satisfied. [Emphasis added] 
This withdrawal-by-election section mirrors the preceding 
annexation-by-election section in permitting a city-initiated 
public vote. These sections also differ importantly. 73-8-49 
applies only to annexation to "metropolitan water districts." 73-
8-50 permits withdrawal "from any water district." 
The proximity of these sections and the broader terms of the 
withdrawal section evidence legislative intent. Cities which join 
a metropolitan district by election should fce able to withdraw from 
an existing water district by the same election, provided bonded 
debt service is assured. Otherwise, citizens would be trapped 
within two districts while deriving service benefits from only one. 
Service districts would proliferate and double taxation would be 
institutionalized. The legislature seeks to eliminate both these 
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evils.51 
The trial court ruled that 73-8-50 does not permit withdrawal-
by-election from the Conservancy District. It decided that a 
"water conservancy district" is not included within the term "any 
water district." Sandy City appealed this ruling on the basis that 
"any water district" is unambiguous and should not have been 
interpreted to contradict its plain meaning. 
The term "any water district" appears repeatedly and advisedly 
in this section and must be given meaning.52 In the absence of 
ambiguity, the statute should be accorded its plain language. 
Although legislative intent is important, the best indication of 
legislative intent is the statute's plain language.53 
The term "water district" has a plain meaning. It refers to 
a special function government having water as its central object. 
The legislature has declared that its policy is "to avoid 
the inequities of double taxation and the proliferation of 
special service districts." Utah Code Ann. 10-2-401(3). 
52
 All words in the Metropolitan Water District Act are used 
advisedly, and all should be given meaning wherever possible. 
Metropolitan Water District of Salt Lake City v. Salt Lake City, 
14 Utah 2d 171, 380 P.2d 721, 724 (1974). 
53
 Berube v. Fashion Center, P. 2d , 104 Utah Adv 
Reports 4 (Ut Sup Ct 1989) and Johnson v. Utah State Retirement 
Office, 621 P.2d 1234 (Utah Sup Ct 1988). See also the following 
cases cited with approval in Johnson: Kuehner v. Irving Trust 
Co. , 299 U.S. 445, 449 (1937) (where statutory language is clear, 
its meaning cannot be affected by resort to the legislative 
history); United States v. Richards, 583 F.2d 491, 495 (10th Cir. 
1978) ("Legislative history as an aid in determining the intent 
of Congress is permissible only if the statute is ambiguous11) ; 
Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 
(Utah 1984)(best indicator of legislative intent is the statutes1 
plain language); State v. Archuletta, 526 P.2d 911, 912 (Utah 
1974)(in the absence of ambiguity, there is nothing to construe). 
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There are many kinds of such districts in Utah. 
"Water district" is a word commonly Used to describe all such 
types of districts.55 The term "any" is also in common usage and 
simply means "one or more."56 "Any water district" thus refers to 
one or more special purpose or multi-purpose district having water 
as its central object. 
In Utah, the term "water district" commonly includes 
conservancy districts. The following are examples of application 
of that term to such districts: 
1. The Chairman of the Finance Coitimittee of the District's 
Board of Directors, routinely and publicly refers to the District 
as a "water district."57 
54
 Water conservation (irrigation) districts, UTAH CODE ANN. 
73-7-1, et seq.; metropolitan water districts, UTAH CODE ANN. 73-
8-1, et seq./ water conservancy districts, UTAH CODE ANN. 73-9-1, 
et seq.; drainage districts, UTAH CODE ANN. 19-2-1 et seq.; 
special service districts, UTAH CODE ANN. 11-23-1 et seq.; county 
service districts, UTAH CODE ANN. 17-29pl et seq.; and water 
improvement districts, UTAH CODE ANN. 17-61-1, et seq. 
55
 Swensen, "A Primer of Utah Water Law: Part II, 1985 Utah 
Law Review 1, 46 ("In most states the^e are a multitude of 
different kinds of special water districts"); also Carter, 
Overlapping Powers and Functions of Wat^r Districts and River 
Authorities, Proceedings, Water Law Conference 104 (Univ. of Tex. 
1956), quoted in Trelease and Gould, Cases and Materials on Water 
Law (4th ed. 1986), pp. 533-34 (referring to 8 such entities as 
types of "water districts"). The U.S. Supreme Court recently used 
the term to refer to various types of districts in Ouinn v. 
Millsap, 57 Law Week 4686, 4689 (1989). The Utah Supreme Court 
has likewise used the term broadly, apparently to include both 
metropolitan and conservancy districts. Nestman v. South Davis 
Water Improve. Dist., 398 P.2d 203, 204 including footnote 2. 
56




2. Legal counsel for the District repeatedly refers to the 
District as a "water district" in this action.58 
3. Legal counsel for the Conservancy District also used 
the term "a Utah water district" to entitle a conservancy district 
a prior appeal before this Court.59 
4. In the same prior appeal, attorneys for Weber Basin 
Water Conservancy District, Uintah Water Conservancy District, and 
Carbon Water Conservancy District, likewise referred to their 
respective entities as "water districts."60 
"Any water district" is broadly inclusive and should not have 
been interpreted to contradict common usage and plain meaning. It 
is not the trial court's function to rewrite an unambiguous statute 
to exclude a particular water district. Express statutes are not 
rendered ambiguous merely because, as in this case, defendant 
claims they should be interpreted other than according to their 
plain meaning. 
The fact that "any water district" appears in the Metropolitan 
Water Act does not imply that conservancy districts are excluded 
from the common meaning of that term. From their inception, 
conservancy districts have been regarded as "analogous in 
DO
 T-35 and S-103. 
59
 See full title of Timpanogos Planning and Water 
Management Agency v. Central Utah Water Conservancy District, a 
Utah water district, 690 P.2d 562 (Utah 1984). 
60
 Brief of Intervenors in Timpanogos, p. 3 (No. 19482). 
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character" to metropolitan districts. 
Even if the phrase "any water district" were subject to more 
than one meaning, it should not have be4n applied other than in 
accordance with its literal wording unless it was so unclear as to 
be wholly beyond reason, inoperable, or it contravened some basic 
constitutional right.62 There is no evidence that giving "any water 
district" its common meaning would produce any such result. 
B. LEGISLATIVE INTENTION IN ENACTING SECTION 73-8-50 WAS TO AVOID 
TAXATION INEQUITIES AND PROMOTE DEMOCRATIC GOVERNMENT 
Central to Section 73-8-50 is the ri$ht of the electorate to 
determine whether to withdraw from a cjonservancy district, a 
metropolitan district, or any other water district. This right was 
granted by the legislature to insure that those who do not receive 
benefits are not required to pay for them. As stated by Justice 
Wolfe: 
Back of the legislative acts which made possible the 
establishment of irrigation, drainage, improvement and 
mosquito abatement districts and ever} metropolitan water and 
water conservancy districts, lay the principle that they who 
receive the benefits should pay for tltiem. Where the benefits 
are local, the locality which they are to serve should be 
given the opportunity to determine foy election whether the 
property owners therein desire the benefits in contemplation. 
The Utah Supreme Court has recognized that "the people have 
an inalienable right to repeal a charter which they had a right to 
People v. Letford. 79 P.2d 274, 281 (Colo. 1938); also, 
Tygesen v. Magna Water Co., 226 P.2d 127, |1L30 (Ut 1950). 
62
 Gord v. Salt Lake City, 20 Utah 2d 138, 434 P.2d 449, 451 
(1967). 
63
 Concurring in Tygesen v. Magna Wat^ er Co. , 226 P.2d 127, 
140 (Ut 1950). 
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adopt.:11 The trial court erred in failing to recognize 
legislative intention to promote this right by statute. In so 
doing, it undermined legislative purposes behind the plain wording 
of Section 73-8-50, and vitiated an important right of a community 
to select its own form of government. 
C. NUMEROUS PUBLIC POLICIES MITIGATE IN FAVOR OF AN ELECTION ON 
WITHDRAWAL 
Critical public policies underlie the City's right to withdraw 
from the Conservancy District by election. The Court has the duty 
to render such interpretation of laws as will best promote 
protection of the public.65 Several of these policies are 
summarized as follows: 
1. Promote Representative Government. The state 
legislature has declared its intention to retard the further 
"proliferation of special service districts."66 A conservancy 
district is the worst form of these districts. It is organized 
without an election and local elected officials neither govern the 
district nor supervise its operations.67 Yet, the district is 
authorized to tax, borrow, and spend public resources. 
The withdrawal-by-election process of 73-8-50 provides the 
** Provo City v. Anderson, 367 P.2d 457, 460 (1961). 
65
 Curtis v. Harmon, 575 P.2d 1044, 1046 (Ut Sup Ct 1978). 
66
 UTAH CODE ANN. 10-2-401(3). 
67
 See Utah Special Service District Act, 11-23-1, et seq. ; 
County Service Area Act, 17-29-1 et seq.; Metropolitan Water 
District Act, 73-8-1 et seq.; and Water Conservancy Act, 73-8-1 
et seq. 
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only effective means by which conservancy districts can be held to 
account for their public stewardships. To void this mechanism 
would encourage conservancy districts to proliferate unabated, in 
the shadows, outside the conrrol of the miblic or their local 
elected officials. 
2. Avoid Double Taxation. City residents will soon decide 
whether to join the Metropolitan Water District. If they do, they 
will receive their water from that district and be subject to its 
taxes. The Conservancy District wants to continue to tax City 
residents whether they receive District services or not. 
Legislative policy seeks to "avoid the inequities of double 
taxation."68 The Legislature has provided a statutory procedure 
by which such tax inequities can be avoided — withdrawal from a 
water district by election. Express legislative policy mandates 
that this statute be given its clear and intended meaning. 
3. Discourage Monopolistic Practices. By refusing to 
permit the City to leave the Conservancy District under any 
conditions,69 the District seeks to maintain a territorial monopoly 
over the most essential of economic commodities — water. The 
Legislature has determined that such actions which restrain free 
commerce is contrary to the "preservation of our democratic, 
political and social institutions."70 73-8-50 permits the 
UTAH CODE ANN. 10-2-401(3). 
Amended Complaint, para. 20. 
UTAH CODE ANN. 76-912. 
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electorate to pierce the monopoly by the use of their most 
fundamental right — to vote in a public election. 
To vitiate this statute, is to leave the electorate to the 
mercy of a board which maintains an economic monopoly through the 
use of governmental power, yet is not elected by the people nor 
supervised by their local representatives. 
4. Respect for Legislative Prerogatives. The Utah 
Legislature has expressed its desire to permit withdrawal by 
election. The objectives of this statute are reasonable in that 
they attempt to avoid economic inequities and promote democratic 
government. Due respect for the legislative prerogative in 
lawmaking requires that the judiciary support enactments of the 
Legislature where the legislative scheme employs reasonable means 
to effectuate a legitimate objective.71 Respect for legislative 
intentions mitigates in favor of a ruling giving effect to the 
election statute. 
5. Balancing of Interests. The Conservancy District 
refused to permit the City to withdraw under any circumstances. 
Its decision failed to balance the interests of the City and the 
District. On the contrary, its decision was based solely on "the 
best interests of the district." 
The District's self-interest approach contradicts state water 
policy. Because all state waters are the property of the public, 
the state engineer must reject water applications if approval would 
Utah Technology Finance Corp. v. Wilkinson, 724 P.2d 406 
(Ut Sup Ct 1986). 
26 
interfere with the public welfare/ It is inconceivable that the 
legislature would intend public welfare to govern a single change 
of water use, while ignoring the public where development interests 
of an entire urban community are at stake. 
The election statute provides a process whereby such disputes 
may be resolved openly — it begins with review by the elected 
officials of the City. Then the matter is set for election. 
Through the election process, public hearings are held, citizens 
are heard and informed, equities can be considered, and service 
delivery efficiencies advanced. 
The Utah Supreme Court has ruled that city government is an 
appropriate forum for balancing interests and resolving disputes. 
They are the representative government at the local level and 
provide a full range of urban services to the public. Their 
expertise and public contact provide an ideal forum for resolution 
of the withdrawal question. 
This Court should give deference to the statutory election 
process, and permit the City to proceed with the election, in order 
that these policies may be effectuated. 
6. Balance of Powers Principles, The Utah Supreme Court 
has asked trial courts to refer questions that are properly 
committed to other branches of government to the appropriate 
Bonham v. Morgan, P. 2d , 102 Utah Adv Rep 8, 11 (Ut 
Sup Ct 1989). , 
73
 Loveland v. Orem City, 746 P.?d 763, 773 (Ut Sup Ct 
1987) . 
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administrative process, in order that the powers of other branches 
of government will not be impinged.74 The process which has been 
defined for resolving this withdrawal dispute is the election 
process. 
This Court will promote balance of powers principles by 
recognizing the election process, which process is defined and 
adopted through the legislative powers of this state. 
7. Upholding Constitutionality of Conservancy Act. If 
the withdrawal-by-election statute is not given effect, the 
Conservancy Act will permit the non-elected board of the 
Conservancy District to continue to tax City residents at the 
maximum rate, indefinitely and in its own "best interests." 
Point III of this brief summarizes some of the constitutional 
prohibitions against taxation by the non-elected board of the 
Conservancy District. If city residents are provided no means of 
escape from the District, there is serious doubt as to the 
constitutionality of these taxation powers. 
Where there are possible alternatives as to interpretation and 
application of a statute, one which will render it constitutional 
and the other will render it constitutionally doubtful, the former 
should be chosen.75 The Court can best dispel doubt as to the 
constitutionality of taxation powers by the Conservancy District, 
by giving effect to the statutory right of voters to withdraw from 
Society of Professional Journalists v. Bullock. 727 P.2d 
198, 65 Utah Adv Rep 8, 11-12 (1987). 
75
 Ggrd, supra, p. 453. 
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the District by election. 
POINT III 
THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN RULING 
THAT THE NON-ELECTED BOARD OF 
DIRECTORS OF THE CONSERVANCY DISTRICT 
MAY CONSTITUTIONALLY TAX LAND IN SANDY 
CITY 
A- THE DELEGATION OF TAXING POWER TO THE CONSERVANCY DISTRICT IS 
PROHIBITED BY SEPARATION OF POWERS AND TAX AUTHORITY CLAUSES OF 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
The Water Conservancy Act, Utah Code Ann.
 f 73-9-1 et seq. , 
outlines the method by which water conservancy districts in the 
state of Utah may be created and the powers they may exercise. 
The act vests the "district court11 with power to establish 
conservancy districts over a geographic area.76 Once established, 
the non-elected officials of the district have power to levy and 
collect taxes on all property in the district77 until such 
officials decide it is in the district's own "best interests" to 
exclude property from its boundaries.78 The statutory assignment 
of these powers in the Conservancy Act raises directly the 
constitutional limitation on the delegation of legislative 
authority. 
The Legislature's power to provide by statute for taxation of 
property must be exercised in light of several constitutional 
provisions, most notably, the doctrine of separation of powers. 
76
 UTAH CODE ANN. 73-9-3. 
77
 UTAH CODE ANN. 73-9-15. 
78
 UTAH CODE ANN. 73-9-30. 
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The Utah Constitution expressly states what the Federal 
Constitution only implies — that the three branches of government 
must remain separate. Article V, Section 1 provides: 
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall 
be divided into three distinct departments, the 
Legislati/e, the Executive, and the Judicial; and no 
person charged with the exercise of powers properly 
belonging to one of these departments, shall exercise any 
functions appertaining to either of the others, except 
in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted. 
[Emphasis added] 
Thus, one branch is expressly forbidden to exercise power properly 
belonging to another branch. 
Utah Constitution Article VI, Section 1 vests the legislative 
power of the State in the Senate and House of Representatives.79 
The Utah Supreme Court has expressly found that taxation is an 
"essential legislative function" which cannot be delegated: 
The Legislature is not permitted to abdicate or transfer 
to others the essential legislative function with which 
it is thus vested. The imposition of a tax and the 
designation of those who must pay the same is such an 
essential legislative function as may not be transferred 
to others.80 
Thus, the power to tax property cannot be delegated unless 
expressly permitted by the Constitution. The setting of local 
government boundaries, upon which such tax jurisdiction is based, 
79
 Except for such power as is vested in the people through 
initiative and referendum. See Lehi City v. Meiling, p. 534. 
80 
Western Leather & Finding Co. v. State Tax Commission, 48 
P.2d 526, 528 (Utah 1935). This case was cited with approval for 
this principle in State v. Gallion, 572 P. 2d 683, 687 (Utah 
1977) . The Conservancy District in this case admits that the 
levy and assessment of taxes is a legislative function. See 
defendant's Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, p. 17. 
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those municipal officers who ar<* - *th.*. :. r * • I • ^ lortrd 
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Rampton v. Barlow, 2 3 Utah ?d ^83, 4t». i I 
< : 
McQui 11 i.n , Municipal Corporations A 4 . 
198i: ) . 
by the population to be taxed or appointed in some mode 
to which they have given their assent.84 
The directors of the Conservancy District are not elected — 
nor was the District created with the consent of the people. 
Without public approval, Conservancy cannot be vested with taxation 
power under the provisions of our state constitution. Accordingly, 
the provisions of the Conservancy Act, which purport to grant the 
District taxation authority, violate the Utah Constitution. 
B. THE DELEGATION OF TAXING POWER TO THE CONSERVANCY DISTRICT IS 
ALSO PROHIBITED BY THE "RIPPER CLAUSE" OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION 
Section 73-9-9 of the Conservancy Act provides for the 
appointment of boards of directors of water conservancy districts 
to be made by the county commission of a single county district 
and by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate in 
multi-county districts. Directors of the Salt Lake County Water 
Conservancy District are appointed by the Governor. 
The statutory assignment of taxing powers to this appointed 
board raises the constitutional prohibition of the "Ripper Clause" 
(Article VI, Section 28), of the Utah Constitution, which states: 
The Legislature shall not delegate to any special 
commission, private corporation or association, any power 
to make, supervise or interfere with any municipal 
improvement, money, property or effects, whether held in 
trust or otherwise, to levy taxes, select a capital site, 
or perform any municipal function.[Emphasis added] 
This constitutional language expressly prohibits a special 
™ State v. Standford, 24 Utah 148, 66 P. 1061, 1063 (1901). 
This case reflects the general rule. 16 McQuillin, Municipal 
Corporations, 44.24 (3rd Ed. 1988). 
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XIV, Section B; of the Utah Constitution do permit taxing power 
to be delegated to the elected legislativo officials of counties 
and municipalities However, the b'Mrc of directors of the 
Conservancy District are not elected; nor is the District a 
"municipality." The Conservancy District claims to be a "quasi -
municipal corporation." See Defendant's Memorandum in Support of 
Motion to Plsmiss, 
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has specified the central issue in determining a "special 
commission". It is whether the people, through their elected local 
officials, have control of the activity and can change its scope 
at any time. 1 
The Conservancy District is "separate and distinct" from 
municipal government92 — in fact it is essentially independent of 
both state and local control. Professor Swenson summarizes this 
point: 
In conservancy districts, the democratic process of a 
general election plays a relatively small role. 
Conservancy districts are organized by the judiciary, and 
although they may levy ad valorem taxes and have the 
power of eminent domain, there is little public 
accountability for their activities. Also there is only 
nominal continued supervision of the district by the 
state through the governor's power to appoint the 
directors. The only role played by the electorate is in 
the election to approve the issuance of bonds to finance 
expenditures which are greater than the ordinary annual 
income of the district. 
The following characteristics further distinguish between 
districts and municipal government and demonstrate the extent to 
which the public and their elected representatives have lost 
control of this entity: 
(1) A voluntary exercise of will (i.e., an election) is 
required for a City to be established.94 The District is 
Municipal Building Authority v. Lowder, 711 P.2d 273, 218 
- 282 (Utah 1985). 
92
 Patterick v. Carbon Water Conservancy District, 145 P.2d 
503, 512 (Utah 1944). 
93
 Swensen, supra, p. 49. [Emphasis added] 
94
 UTAH CODE ANN. 10-2-102.8. 
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(5) While elected city officials are charged with the 
responsibility of balancing a broad range of competing interests; 
district officials are not. The District is critical of decisions 
which consider public interests. The District's decision to refuse 
to permit the City to leave the District was based on its own "best 
interest," 
(6) Cities are required to hold an election before 
approving general obligations bonds. However, the Conservancy 
District has managed to effectively give bondholders recourse to 
the District and its taxpayers without an election or meaningful 
notice to the public.100 
(7) The District exercises broad unregulated economic, 
legislative and political power which undermines the ability of the 
people and local elected officials to control its administrative 
discretion, thereby rendering it a fourth branch of government — 
outside politically accountable governmental processes.101 Too 
often, instead of balancing competing interests, the District is 
found competing against city interests and those of the general 
public.102 
Justice Zimmerman has observed that "[U]ntil the people choose 
See Point IV, hereafter. Also, Lowder, p. 282. 
1 0 1 . . t . . i . 
See discussion in Scott M. Matheson, Jr., "Eligibility of 
Public Officers and Employees to Serve in the State Legislature: 
an Essay on Separation of Powers, Politics, and Constitutional 
Policy," 1988 Utah Law Review 295, 328. 
102
 S - 2 3 3 , S-244 t h r o u g h 245 , and S - 2 6 2 . 
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reversed. 
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thinK it appropriate to take a balancing approach, one 
which considers a number of factors that are pertinent 
to the specific legislation at issue. These include, but 
are not limited to, the relative abilities of the state 
and municipal governments to perform the function, the 
degree to which the performance of the function affects 
the interests of those beyond the boundaries of the 
municipality, and the extent to which the legislation 
under attack will intrude upon the ability of the people 
within the municipality to control through their elected 
officials the substantive po] :i c j es that affect them 
uniquely.104 
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->11 V-i 
103
 Concurring •;.^n;^ it ah Technology Finance Corp. v. 
Wilkinson, 723 P. 2d 40b, 4i.o ( , ;).'•,6) . 
104
 Id. , at p. 40. 
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other hand, the City has submitted numerous affidavits on all 
elements of the Supreme Court test, demonstrating that continued 
taxation by the Conservancy District constitutes a profound 
interference with the policies of the public and their elected city 
representatives. The City has also described means by which water 
services can be lawfully provided to the geographic area of the 
District, while avoiding tax tyranny and public policy obstruction 
by non-elected District officials.105 
The ripper clause forbids granting a non-elective board the 
power to levy taxes, regardless of whether the board deals with 
municipal or state affairs. However, if it determines that the 
ripper clause is directed only to preventing interference with 
local government, under West Jordan, the Supreme Court should 
require a factual inquiry and balancing test on all constitutional 
claims at issue in this action. 
The Utah Supreme Court has placed a heavy factual burden on 
those, such as the Conservancy District, who, through summary 
motion, seek to avoid factual inquiry: 
A motion to dismiss is only appropriate where it appears 
to a certainty that the plaintiff would not be entitled 
to relief under any state of facts which could be proved 
in support of its claim. In reviewing an order granting 
a motion to dismiss, we are obliged to construe the 
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff 
and to indulge all reasonable inferences in its favor."106 
Because the Conservancy District presented no facts, the 
WD
 S-245 and S-237. 
106
 Arrow Industries, Inc. v. Zions First National Bank, 767 
P.2d 935, 936 (Ut Sup Ct 1989). 
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incurred in the amount and for the purposes specified in 
the resolution. [Emphasis added] 
Despite this election requirement, the Conservancy District 
has invented a way to effectively give bondholders recourse tok the 
District and its taxpayers without an election. It did this by 
adopting the following language in Section 6.19 of the District's 
bond resolution: 
Levy of Tax to Pay Operation and Maintenance Costs. The 
Issuer shall, so long as any of the Bonds or Contracts 
are Outstanding, levy annually the tax of .0004 on the 
dollar, or the maximum amount of such different annual 
levy as may be hereafter provided for by law, of assessed 
valuation of taxable property within the Issuer or so 
much thereof as shall be necessary, for payment of 
Operation and Maintenance Costs pursuant to the 
provisions of Section 73-9-16, Utah Code Annotated 1953, 
as amended. 
The Conservancy District has formally confirmed that this 
section obligates the District to levy maximum taxes to secure 
these bonds. On August 20, 1987, the Conservancy District adopted 
the following findings regarding this section: 
The District has outstanding bonded indebtedness: the 
1987 Series Revenue Refunding Bonds in the principal 
amount of $33,340,000, refunded all prior bonded 
indebtedness of the District. Section 6.19 of the 
Resolution Providing for the Issuance of Water 
Conservancy Revenue Bonds adopted by the District on 
February 6, 1987, provides that the District will levy 
the maximum tax authorized by statute on all lands within 
the District so long as any bonds or contracts are 
outstanding. 
The District's finding that it must maintain a "maximum tax" 
was not inadvertent. The District repeats these findings that 
Section 6.19 requires a maximum tax levy: 
S-204. [Emphasis added] 
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District to levy its maximum levy on all lands within the 
District may be interpreted to prohibit the exclusion of 
lands within the District * - order 1 * preserve tax 
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this case. The inescapable conclusion is that the trial court's 
order of dismissal removing the election requirement, does not rest 
upon sound legal theory or precedent. 
B. THE DISTRICT'S BOND NOTICES ARE PROCEDURALLY AND SUBSTANTIVELY 
INADEQUATE 
As stated above, the District's bond decision obligates tax 
revenues to maximum levels — yet, no hearing was held. The 
absence of such hearing renders meaningless recent Truth in 
Taxation legislation which requires specific public notice and 
hearing of any tax revenue increase, through growth or otherwise, 
beyond the certified tax rate.112 Any opportunity for public 
comment to be considered at subsequent tax hearings will be 
vitiated by Section 6.19 and its obligation to "tax to the max" 
incurred well in advance of such hearings. 
Even if the bonds were true "revenue" obligations of the 
District and did not obligate tax revenues, the notices provided 
in connection with these bonds were inadequate to provide due 
process. Such deficiencies relate to both notice content and 
publication. 
Certain due process notice requirements are well recognized 
in Utah. The following are among the public policies which 
112
 UTAH CODE ANN. 59-2-918. The "certified tax rate" 
generally means the tax rate that will provide the same ad 
valorem property tax revenue for each taxing entity as was levied 
for the prior year. See Utah Code Ann. 59-2-924. 
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appeared on that agenda related to bonding. It was listed fourth 
under "Report of Finance Committee" and simply stated "Notice of 
Intent to Issue Bonds." 
Appurtenant to the right of notice is the right to be notified 
of the issues no be considered therein.119 The District's agenda 
gave notice only that the Finance Committee was making a report. 
There was no notice of what bonds were under consideration by the 
committee, what projects were contemplated, the amount of bonds, 
or whether an election or further hearing would be held. In short, 
a citizen receiving the foregoing notice would have had no 
indication of the type, scope or purpose of the bonding action 
under contemplation by the district. 
(2) The Utah Municipal Bond Act requires the District to 
"publish a notice of bonds to be issued" in the newspaper. The Bond 
Act does not specify the number of publications required. However, 
the Bond Act is adopted by reference in the Water Conservancy 
120 • t 
Act. The definition section of the Water Conservancy Act states 
"[W]henever the term 'publication1 is used in this act and no 
manner specified therefor, it shall be taken to mean once a week 
for three consecutive weeks in at least one newspaper of general 
circulation in each county wherein such publication is to be 
made."121 Despite this process, a "Notice of Bonds to be Issued" 
Grindstone Butte Mutual Canal v. Idaho Power Co. , 98 
Idaho 860, 574 P.2d 902, 907 (1978). 
120
 UTAH CODE ANN. 73-9-31(1) (d) . 
121
 UTAH CODE ANN. 73-9-2. 
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burdens11 and the risk of an erroneous deprivation of the employee's 
rights. 
Both the Tenth Circuit and Utah Supreme Court have recognized 
the need for notice and hearing prior to the effecting property 
1 "PL. 
rights. The need for some pre-bonding and taxation hearing is 
evident in the instant case as well. 
Utah statutes grant the public a "property" interest in all 
water of the state.125 The "beneficial use "of water is the measure 
of that right. Truth-in-taxation legislation also establishes a 
public interest in property tax rates.127 Due process notice 
requirements should attach to such rights to assure that public 
• 128 
interests are not deprived without notice or hearing. 
The District's proposed bond will acquire millions of dollars 
of worth of water interests. They will be of no benefit to the 
Sandy community following its annexation to Metropolitan. Further, 
such bonds contractually obligate the tax rate on private property 
at the maximum level for the term of the bond. For the District 
to make such commitments, at Sandy's expense, without advance 
public notice or hearing, mocks these property interests of the 
See Goudeau v. Independent School District, 823 F.2d 1429 
(10th Cir. 1987) and Clark v. Second Circuit Court, 741 P.2d 956 
(Utah Sup. Ct. 1987). 
125
 Utah Code Ann. 7 3 - 1 - 1 . 
126
 Utah Code Ann. 7 3 - 1 - 3 . 
127
 U tah Code Ann. 5 9 - 2 - 9 1 8 . 
128 • 
Compare discussion in Bonham v. Morgan, supra. 
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e x e r c i s e i + <= o v ^ r p i ' 1 * " n i r i Q H i . - r i n n in i-an't-* • . - therwise . - • * ) 
1
, t ; 
p r o v i d t a mean:. t.>r tn< C o n s e r v a n * \ iMrr.r Let i .*• ; i:,u£ 
w i t h o u t o b l i a . i ^ v 1 ^ p e r t i e t +^ i * ^ h ^ .'"i+-\- »M 
a p p r o v e an i .
 t , . _ , t , t , orin ano , . . . . , * 
" i s t r i c t , c a h LL-I * ' E f f e c t i v e l y pt .-.•sontod r.- * r- p u b l i c r c r 
c o n s i d e r a t - . 
The ti^aJ court' ^  order o. ._,,.:. .. ... 
has no authority to qrant ouch relief asserting that procedures fcr 
qn\ T? •'• "• y - : • - -
 :- i - . ' ] . - , * • • • 
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statute. This conclusion directly contradicted previous rulings 
in this consolidated case. 
The Third District Court has previously found, in a prior 
phase of this consolidated case, that it has powers, beyond those 
in expressed in the Conservancy Act, to permit the exclusion of 
lands from the District, and presumably avoid other forms of 
injustice. 
The Court found these powers to be based on several theories 
posited by counsel of record for the Conservancy District. For 
instance, counsel for the District has also argued, in this same 
numbered case, that the Court has authority to exclude property 
from a District under Rule 60(b)(7) of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. That rule states: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his 
legal representative from a final judgment, order, or 
proceeding for the following reasons: . . . (7) any other 
reason justifying relief from the operation of the 
judgment.130 
Thus, counsel for the District has accurately recognized that 
by modifying the court order establishing the District, the Court 
may apply its jurisdiction to address the all inequities raised in 
this action. Authority for broad equity jurisdiction is confirmed 
in many other Utah cases. The following are some examples: 
(1) The Supreme Court has severed a petition requirement 
from a statutory process in order to avoid a constitutional 
S-106 through 110. 
S-56. 
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challenge to t::l u it process. ' :!""li T 1 i :ii s sever ance :i s mar kedl ;r s J :i " iii ] ar 
with the Third District Court's findings in prior phases of thi s 
sanio iirinifiihr'i'TMi car.n, fhmt w h o m sf ntiif oiry severance processes are 
burdensom* .^y need nut be iuLlowul 
': aprene Court han rncoqnized that " [T ] 'f an 
<*;_,.,., .. int-frpi MI a " t-Ttijfp innds to an injustice, 
courts fre4uc:hiij i^bL.icL oi Liilaryo the ordinary meaning ul the 
words used in order t« effectuate the in1 ant i J^ : • urpo; c :* : 
mean. \ . eirus provides ampin justit .oai^ n i^x permitting i :,^  
City • '"* i a wjrhdrawal olerrior* i-.iru..>r. ' :^. i. _, * *t 
Thus, tn^ relief requesteu i * • *" provided 
C L V I I Procedure: or mio; general p r m i iplcs or equity
 : .-my 
ccwb:natiun ' ' - /^ -* > —~v-^ • -.-,. - - , ,.- >«-^  option 
of ; own iaii.u,, . , , ~,.~..l cqu . L,. , ^ .. . . . i. 
CONCLUSION 
1 • sovere:7^' Inose 
^ <u«„ cj^ - -*-JLi*iev^. i?iu./c . * . . » . i *.*_ , . ,w »ti] nance/ 
: ^ .• ^  ithdra 'in:, h not an icademic principal. It i s 
Doenges , supra 
S-* ., :'oction 73-9-40 of the Conservancy Act is a saving 
and severance clause. 
133
 Plutus Min. Co. v. Orme. 289 P. 132 (Utah 1930) . 
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of real and practical effect. 
In this action, the Sandy community suffers political and 
economic domination by the non-elected Conservancy District board. 
The Utah Constitution and state statutes provide a complex of 
measures which permit escape. The trial court closed each of the 
doors permitting withdrawal and left the Sandy Community at the 
economic mercy of the District. 
However, in rejecting the election, the trial court also 
created a constitutional dilemma. If a community can be deprived 
of the right to withdraw from an oppressive government, then 
constitutional review of that district's practices should be 
heightened. In this sense, if the trial court's refusal to permit 
withdrawal is upheld, the Conservancy District should be placed 
under greater constitutional scrutiny. Such requires a case-by-
case factual review on each of the issues presented in this appeal. 
Plaintiffs submit that the trial court's ruling misapprehended 
the important factual, legal and public policy issues before it. 
Its order of dismissal should, accordingly, be reversed. 
DATED this day of July, 1989. 
WALTER R. MILLER 
Sandy City Attorney 
Attorney for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
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